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POLICY CHALLENGE
The ETS must be stabilised by reinforcing the credibility of the system so that
the use of existing low-carbon alternatives (for example burning gas instead of
coal) is incentivised and investment in low-carbon assets is ensured. Further-
more, failure to reinvigorate the ETS might compromise the cost-effective syn-
chronisation of European decarbonisation efforts across sectors and
countries. To restore credibility and to ensure long-term commitment to the
ETS, the European Investment Bank should auction guarantees on the future
emission allowance price.
This will reduce the risk
for low-carbon invest-
ments and enable stabili-
sation of the ETS until a
compromise is found on
structural measures to re-
inforce it in order to
achieve the EU's long-term
decarbonisation targets.
Evolution of the EU carbon price since 2008
THE ISSUE The European Union's emissions trading system (ETS), introduced
in 2005, is the centerpiece of EU decarbonisation efforts and the biggest
emissions trading scheme in the world. After a peak in May 2008, the price of
ETS carbon allowances started to collapse, and industry, civil society and
policymakers began to think about how to ‘repair the ETS’. However, the ETS is
an effective and efficient tool to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, and
although prices have not been stable, it has evolved to cover more sectors and
greenhouse gases, and to become more robust and less distorting. Prices are
depressed because of an interplay of fundamental factors and a lack of
confidence in the system.
Source: Datastream. Price per EU emission allowance.
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YOU'D BETTER BET ON THE ETS
THE EUROPEAN UNION'S EMIS-
SIONS TRADING SYSTEM (ETS) has
had a bumpy start. In particular,
after a peak in May 2008, the
price of tradeable emission al-
lowances has collapsed for vari-
ous reasons (see section 3). This
collapse has resulted in calls from
industry, civil society and policy-
makers to ‘fix’ the ETS. But is it
really broken? Despite its prob-
lems, the ETS has significantly
evolved to cover more sectors,
more countries and more green-
house gases. The allocation of al-
lowances has become less
distorting. The treatment of emis-
sion rights from outside the EU
has become stricter. Fraud has
been made more difficult. The ETS
entered its third phase, at the be-
ginning of 2013, as a more
mature system.
1 THE ETS WORKS
The ETS is a classical cap-and-
trade system specifying a cap for
annual greenhouse gas emis-
sions and allocating a correspon-
ding amount of allowances to
companies covered by the
scheme. By definition, as this cap
has decreased, emissions have
also been reduced. Excluding the
countries that have entered the
scheme since 2005 (Bulgaria and
Romania joined in 2007 and
Norway has participated since
2008) greenhouse gas emissions
from ETS participating installa-
tions declined by about 14 per-
cent between 2005 and 2012
(Figure 1).
Significant emission reductions
were achieved by the tightening
up of the system between the first
and second trading periods
(2005-07 and 2008-12) (Abrell et
al, 2011). A year-on-year emis-
sion reduction of 3.6 percent ap-
pears to be due to the tightening
of the system. It is not explained
by reductions in firm output
caused by changing economic
conditions and reduced produc-
tion in Europe (Table 1).
In addition, there is evidence that
significant emission reductions
already took place before the
start of the ETS in order to comply
with the system from the begin-
ning (Ellerman and Buchner,
2006; Brewer et al, 2009; Eller-
man et al, 2010). Consequently,
the ETS has been able to achieve
its purpose – stimulating addi-
tional emission reductions.
The instrument of carbon trading
was chosen in order to allow
differentiation of carbon
abatement efforts in different
sectors. And indeed, different
sectors exhibited different
emission-reduction strategies
(Figure 2). This is good news. It is
in line with the hypothesis that
different sectors have different
marginal abatement costs, and
the ETS is able to induce the
cheapest carbon reductions.
Table 2 shows that non-metallic
minerals and basic metals were
responsible for the main part of
the emission reductions ob-
served during the shift from the
first to the second trading periods,
while there has been no signifi-
cant additional effect for the
energy and paper sectors (Abrell
et al, 2011).
We conclude that the ETS is achiev-
ing its aim of keeping emissions in
the sectors that it covers under the
cap. As the number of allocated al-
lowances is irresistibly declining
by 37 million EU allowances
(EUAs) each year, emissions will
have to continue to decline.
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Source: Bruegel based on CITL.
Figure 1: Country-level verified ETS emissions, million tonnes CO2
Table 1: Relative change in the growth rate of emissions between
(2005-05) and (2007-08)
Reductions caused by the shift to the second period -3.6%**
Control variables
Changes in turnover 19.1%***
Changes in employment 0.07%
Source: Abrell et al (2011). Note: significance: ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
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1. See
www.eea.europa.eu/dat
a-and-maps/data/data-
viewers/emissions-
trading-viewer.
2. See
www.entsoe.eu/data/da
ta-portal/production/.
3. Trotignon (2011).
4. The national new en-
trants reserves were
set up to distribute free
allowances to new
carbon-emitting instal-
lations in order to not
put them at a disadvan-
tage compared to exist-
ing installations that
obtained allowances for
free in the second
phase of the ETS. Not all
of the reserved al-
lowances were used.
5. Article 10(a) 8 of the
revised Emissions Trad-
ing Directive
2009/29/EC contains
the provision to set
aside 300 million al-
lowances for subsidis-
ing innovative clean
energy installations.
6. European Commis-
sion (2012).
7. The relative impor-
tance of the four factors
for the surplus is diffi-
cult to disentangle. An
upper bound for the
contributions of the in-
dividual factors be-
tween 2008 and 2012
is in the range of 500
million tonnes from the
recession, 1420m
tonnes from interna-
tional credits, 200m
2 THE SURPLUS
Since 2008, more EUAs have
been issued each year than were
used1, leading to a substantial
stock of allowances in circulation.
Several fundamental factors are
responsible for this surplus. First,
industrial production in Europe
was strongly affected by the
‘Great Recession’. While produc-
tion grew between 2003 and
2007 by almost three percent per
year, it decreased by almost two
percent per year between 2008
and 2012. In turn, demand for al-
lowances substantially de-
creased. Assuming an annual
decline of the allowance demand
of five percent compared to the
baseline, the annual demand re-
duction from 2008 to 2012 would
be more than 100 million tonnes.
Second, the ETS is only one of
several instruments of European
climate policy. Energy efficiency
policies and renewable energy
promotion also lead to carbon re-
ductions. Meeting the EU 20 per-
cent energy efficiency target and
the 20 percent renewables target
reduces the need for fossil-fueled
electricity generation – the
largest contributor to emissions
covered by the ETS. The produc-
tion of electricity from solar and
wind in the EU doubled from 105
TWh (terawatt hours) in 2008 to
214 TWh in 20122.
Third, emission reductions from
outside the EU are allowed into
the ETS in the form of additional
credits. In the ETS second phase,
EU legislation allowed 1,420 mil-
lion tonnes (ie 284 million tonnes
per year) of carbon reductions
from outside the ETS to be used
instead of European emission al-
lowances3. This option has been
widely used, also because no
other country or region has al-
lowed such a generous monetisa-
tion of foreign emission
reductions.
Fourth, according to the European
Commission (2012), some addi-
tional 500 million allowances
from three exceptional sources
have been brought to the market
in 2012/2013: 1). Unused al-
lowances from the second phase
national new entrants reserves4
were auctioned at the end of the
second phase. 2). The European
Investment Bank is selling a fixed
amount of third-phase al-
lowances in order to fund a
number of carbon capture and
storage and innovative renew-
ables projects (NER300 pro-
gramme)5. 3). Some third-phase
allowances have been auctioned
early in order to avoid the scarcity
that was feared at the time the cli-
mate package was negotiated in
2008/2009.
As emission allowances not used
in the second trading period
(2008-12) can also be held over
and used in the third trading
period, a surplus of “well over 1.5
billion allowances, and even as
large as 2 billion allowances”
might have accumulated at the
start of the third phase6, 7.
3 THE EMISSION PRICE SLUMP
A temporary surplus of
allowances is not necessarily a
problem for the ETS. As the
system is to run indefinitely with
a constantly decreasing annual
Table 2: Relative change in the growth rate of emissions between (2005-06) and (2007-08) by sector
Pulp & paper Non-metallic minerals Basic metals Electricity & heat
Reductions caused by shift to the 2nd period -2.9% -8.7%*** -9.5%* -0.1%
Control
variables
Changes in turnover 15.4%** 29.9%*** 8.9% 13.6%**
Changes in employment -6.2% -4.6% 9.9% 1.2%
Source: Abrell et al (2011). Note: significance: * at 10%, ** at 5 % and *** at 1%.
Other
Oil refineries (-28%)
Metal ore (-4%)
Iron & steel (-52%)
Cement clinker (-38%)
Glass (+34%)
Ceramic products (+141%)
Pulp & paper (+23%)
Combustion installations (-10%)
Coke ovens (-26%)
Aircraft operators
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Source: Bruegel based on CITL. Note: million tonnes of CO2.
Figure 2: Sector-level verified emissions (reductions 2005-12 in brackets)
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YOU'D BETTER BET ON THE ETS
supply of new allowances it is in
fact neither likely nor desirable
that the system is tight at every
point in time. Using cheap
emission-reduction opportunities
early to save some allowances for
the future is a sensible strategy
both from a company and from a
social perspective. Such efficient
intertemporal arbitrage was
explicitly permitted in the
legislation by allowing the
‘banking’ of allowances between
trading periods.
However, the decline in allowance
prices (Figure 3) indicates that
the possibility of storing the
surplus allowances to sell them at
a later stage has not stabilised
prices today. There are two
possible reasons for this: either
there are too many allowances in
the system even in the long term,
or the system as such is not
credible.
On the first possibility, according
to the European Commission’s
own analysis the number of avail-
able allowances (see orange tri-
angle in Figure 3) will exceed the
number of required allowances
(see the blue line in Figure 3) until
about 2023. After 2025, the
banked allowances will start to be
used up as emissions exceed
annual allocations. Prices will
have to reach €40 by 2030 to
keep emissions below 1400 mil-
lion tonnes per year in the Euro-
pean Commission’s reference
scenario8. The current allowance
price of €5 could thus indicate
that market participants expect –
in contrast to the reference sce-
nario – that the present oversup-
ply will continue (for example due
to persistently lower growth9, re-
inforced complementary energy
policies and/or technological
breakthroughs that make carbon-
abatement significantly cheaper).
But to date, a laxer ETS demand-
supply balance in 2030 appears
no more likely than a tighter than
expected balance. Significantly
higher prices would for example
be possible if some decarbonisa-
tion technologies do not prove
economically viable (for example
carbon capture and storage, or
offshore wind) or if Europe de-
cides to step up the ETS in order to
meet stringent 2050 decarboni-
sation targets10. 
A second rationale for low emis-
sion prices today is that the entire
system is not credible. The ETS is
a politically created market that
fundamentally depends on the
long-term commitment of policy-
makers to maintain the system as
the cornerstone of EU decarboni-
sation efforts. But all long-term
policies are confronted with the
difficulty that policymakers have
to commit to stable regimes
beyond their electoral mandates,
and sometimes even their gener-
ation. Such commitments are
only credible when future compli-
ance remains cheaper than non-
compliance. With the ETS,
policymakers commit to make
future consumers pay high prices
for carbon, in order to make in-
vestment today in low-carbon
technologies attractive. This com-
mitment is hardly credible given
that (1) EU policymakers might
find it difficult to accept the con-
tinuation of stringent decarboni-
sation policies if other countries
do not follow suit in due course11
and (2) maintaining a high carbon
price that largely serves to render
past low-carbon investments
profitable might become politi-
cally difficult12. Even though the
decreasing allocation within the
ETS is enshrined into legislation,
policymakers can at all points in
time shift the demand-supply bal-
ance within the system by includ-
ing new sectors, changing the
treatment of international credits
or providing additional incentives
for carbon reductions within cer-
tain countries and/or sectors cov-
ered by the ETS. This can have a
significant impact on future
carbon prices. The non-negligible
risk that future policymakers will
take measures that obliterate the
ETS to avoid carbon price hikes or
tonnes from renew-
ables, 150 m tonnes
from energy efficiency,
500 million tonnes from
exceptional allowance
allocations.
8. This scenario is
based on current poli-
cies but does not in-
clude the effects of the
recession, international
credits and aviation –
but even if those are in-
cluded the demand and
supply balance is likely
to cause carbon prices
substantially in excess
of €50 as soon as
carbon capture and
storage is required to
prevent industrial emis-
sions to exceed the cap.
9. McKinsey (2009) es-
timates that a reduction
of average 2005-30
GDP growth from 2.1
percent to 1.8 percent
will cause Europe’s
emissions to drop by
only 6 percent com-
pared to the baseline in
2030. Loosely speak-
ing, the carbon price
level predicted in the
Commission’s reference
scenario will be
reached 3-4 years later.
10. According to the EU
Energy Roadmap 2050
the ETS price might
then increase to more
than €200 in 2050.
11. A decision on an
international
agreement to restrict
greenhouse gas
emissions in the most
important economies
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Source: European Energy Exchange. Notes: reference scenario emissions refer to the
sectors currently covered by the ETS: power generation/district heating, energy and
industry; emission allowance prices are linearly interpolated between the values dis-
closed in the Roadmap and, as no initial value is provided, €15 is assumed for 2013.
Figure 3: Future development of the ETS (million tonnes CO2, left scale)
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has been deferred, and
ultimate failure is far
from impossible.
12. See Brunner et al
(2011) for an in-depth
discussion of the
carbon commitment
problem.
13. This is in line with
Neuhoff et al (2012).
The authors argue that
companies that intend
to emit carbon in the
near-to-medium-term
future already acquired
sufficient allowances in
order to hedge against
rising allowance prices.
Consequently only
speculators that require
substantially higher
risk premia will do in-
tertemporal arbitrage.
14. Even if all excess
allowances are taken
out of the system to
make it immediately
binding and hence
prices pick up in the
short term, backloading
will certainly not
incentivise investments
into low-carbon
technologies with long
economic lifetimes, as
the prices will drop as
soon as the allowances
are reintroduced. 
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Commission has proposed a
measure to reduce the immediate
surplus and several policies to
strengthen the system in the
longer term.
To reduce the immediate surplus,
the Commission proposed in No-
vember 2012 to temporarily take
allowances worth six month of EU
emissions (900 million tonnes)
out of the trading system, and sell
them in 2019 and 2020 rather
than 2013-2015. This ‘backload-
ing’ is supposed to boost carbon
prices that dropped below €5 per
tonne. The European Parliament is
expected to vote on the plan in
mid-April 2013.
In its current form, backloading
can be seen as a political placebo.
In pure economic terms, it is not a
cure because shifting the alloca-
tion of some excess allowances
by some years does not change
the underlying value of the al-
lowances14. In political terms, the
argument is that politically agree-
ing on an economically ineffec-
tive treatment such as
backloading is at least an ac-
knowledgment by policymakers
that there is a problem with the
system that they are willing to
rectify, and could pave the way
for structural measures. Further-
more, there is an implicit threat by
the Commission that eventual
structural measures will essen-
tially consist of cancelling the set-
aside allowances – hence
shaping market participants’ ex-
pectations that the backloading
might not be a temporary but a
permanent measure. Even though
economically ineffective, we
cannot determine to what degree
backloading is a valuable political
signal and/or will be effective in
terms of market psychology.
But there is a cost to using
placebos: the credibility of future
treatments. Backloading seeks to
create credibility in a system by
politically infringing on it. The ETS
is enshrined in legislation that is
very difficult to change, and
foresees a linear decline in
carbon emissions even beyond
2050. Demonstrating that the
system can be politically
controlled might backfire in the
long term. Why should market
participants that have to take
investment decisions that will
have an impact for forty or more
years care about a price signal
that can so easily be manipulated
by a political decision in 2013?
Creating long-term credibility in a
market in which supply and
demand can be largely
determined by policymakers is
very difficult. But long-term
credibility is essential to drive
private investment into low-
carbon technologies that will only
pay back after decades.
Furthermore, backloading is –
notwithstanding the long-term
risk to reputation – an almost
costless exercise and hence only
of limited value as a signal.
to tackle continued carbon leak-
age is undermining the carbon
price today.
Consequently, we consider that
the currently observed price
slump is more due to a lack of
long-term credibility of the ETS,
than to a structural reduction of
the cost of compliance with the
current system. The current low
price of emission allowances,
which given an expected carbon
price of €40 in 2030 would imply
a 13 percent annual return, indi-
cates that the ETS is less credible
than the sovereign bonds of, say,
Pakistan (Caa1 negative Moody’s
rating), which are due in 2036
and currently yield 12 percent13.
4 DEALING WITH THE PRICE
SLUMP
The current low carbon price could
put long-term decarbonisation in
Europe at peril by incentivising
long-lived high-carbon invest-
ments that lock-in future emis-
sion patterns, such as lignite-fired
power plants. It could also desta-
bilise the ETS by encouraging na-
tional measures (see Box 1).
To stabilise the ETS, the European
BOX 1: THE RISK OF A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY
The current surplus is regarded by some observers as a sign of political neg-
lect of the ETS. The political acceptance of a prolonged phase of depressed
allowance prices might motivate some member states to pursue comple-
mentary decarbonisation policies. The United Kingdom, for example, is in-
troducing a national carbon floor price that is supposed to exceed the EUA
price. The higher cost of carbon emissions in the UK will incentivise addi-
tional emission reductions. Lower emissions in the UK translate into a lower
demand for EU emission permits. Any permit made redundant in the UK will
ultimately be sold in the rest of Europe – leading to lower ETS prices. This
could incentivise other countries to follow the example of the UK and hence
there is a danger that national policies essentially substitute the ETS. The
ETS could become ineffective because of national policies that assume that
it is ineffective – a classic self-fulfilling prophecy.
Consequently, the long-term cost
of backloading might be greater
than its short-term benefits.
The proponents of backloading
see it as a means to politically
pave the way for structural meas-
ures and bridge the current lack of
scarcity until such structural
measures are implemented. In
2012 the Commission proposed
six different structural measures
(Table 3).
The measures A to E would tighten
the demand-supply balance for
emission allowances. This is sen-
sible if there is a desire to step up
the decarbonisation effort from
that currently foreseen in the ETS
Directive to that foreseen in the
Commission’s Roadmap 205015.
The ETS Directive prescribes a
linear reduction of 1.74 percent of
the average allocation of al-
lowances in 2008-12 – about 37
million EUAs. This would lead to an
allocation of about 654 million
EUAs in 2050, which is about 68
percent below the 2013 emis-
sions covered by the ETS. In con-
trast, the European Commission’s
Roadmap 2050 foresees an econ-
omy-wide emissions reduction of
80 to 95 percent of 1990 levels
by 205016. The Roadmap 2050
has been welcomed by the EU
Council but the 80 to 95 percent
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15. See European Com-
mission (2011).
16. Considering the dis-
proportionate decar-
bonisation burden
allocated to the ETS
sectors (-93 to -99 per-
cent for power, -83 to
-87 percent for industry
versus -54 to -67 per-
cent for transport), and
the decarbonisation al-
ready done by these
sectors between 1990
and 2012, the
Roadmap 2050 would
require an 80 to 95 per-
cent reduction in the
ETS sectors compared
to 2013 levels (see Eu-
ropean Commission,
2011).
17. Poland also vetoed
Council conclusions on
the Roadmap in 2012
because they con-
tained emissions re-
duction targets after
2020. There is some
legal question around
whether unanimity is
required for this. See
http://www.europeanvoi
ce.com/article/2012/no
vember/meps-back-
qualified-majority-deci-
sion-at-climate-talks/7
5789.aspx.
18. In technical terms
this is a ‘put option on
the carbon price’.
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decarbonisation target was not
formally adopted17. Some
member states – especially
Poland – have strong reserva-
tions about tightening the ETS.
The same holds true for measure
F. Such discretionary price-man-
agement mechanisms would
imply a paradigm shift from a pure
quantity-based to a price-based
mechanism. Consequently, the
political discussion on the struc-
tural proposals of the Commission
will take several years and the
outcome is uncertain.
Thus, neither backloading nor
starting a discussion on structural
measures are sufficient to make
market participants believe that
the ETS will remain as the corner-
stone of EU decarbonisation poli-
cies. Furthermore, the long-term
commitment problem is not dealt
with by any of the proposals.
5 REESTABLISHING CONFIDENCE
To establish the necessary confi-
dence in the ETS, policymakers
need to credibly commit to the
system. Such a commitment is
typically achieved by increasing
the cost of future non-compli-
ance. Building up a valuable repu-
tation for credibility through a
history of compliance in political
transactions is currently not an
option (but backloading might de-
stroy some ‘reputation’). External
commitment devices – such as
international carbon reduction
arrangements – in which an ex-
ternal actor punishes domestic
non-compliance, are currently
also not conceivable. An internal
commitment mechanism that
rests on borrowing reputation
from established institutions ap-
pears to be the only viable option.
One such promising mechanism
(initially proposed by Ismer and
Neuhoff, 2006; Pizer, 2011; and
others) consists of selling guaran-
tees of the future carbon price.
This could be organised in the
form of a private contract between
those making low-carbon invest-
ments and the public sector. A
public bank would offer contracts
that agree to pay in the future any
positive difference between the
actual carbon price and a target
level18. Investors would bid to ac-
quire such contracts to hedge
their investments. This would pro-
duce three benefits: first, the
public bank would be able to col-
lect initial payments (a sort of in-
surance premium) and make a
profit if a sufficiently tight climate
policy is maintained. Second, the
private investor significantly re-
duces its exposure to the – politi-
cal – carbon market and hence
accepts longer pay-back times for
its investments. This would
unlock long-term low-carbon in-
vestments that are currently too
risky. Third and most importantly,
public budgets would be signifi-
cantly exposed to the functioning
of the ETS. If future climate policy-
makers take decisions that lead
to increases in the number of
available EUAs, they might be
called back by the treasuries, be-
Table 3: Structural measures proposed by the European Commission
Option Content
A) Increasing EU reduction target to 30 percent in 2020
(achievable via b or c);
B) Retiring a number of allowances in phase III (2013-20);
C) Early revision of the annual linear reduction factor from 1.74
percent per year to a faster rate of decline;
D) Extension of the scope of the ETS to other sectors;
E) Restrict access to international credits;
F) Discretionary price management mechanisms.
Source: European Commission (2012).
cause this would activate the
guarantees pledged to investors.
Consequently, all parties – also
investors not covered by the
scheme – would know that there
is money on the table. This would
serve as a much stronger and
hence more credible commitment
device for preserving the integrity
of the ETS. The lower risk associ-
ated with the future carbon price
would immediately imply a higher
carbon price.
The scheme would introduce a
soft form of a floor price by
making it expensive but not illegal
for policymakers to accept very
low carbon prices in the future. At
the same time, the possibility of
future carbon policy shifts –
which undermine the credibility
of discretionary price manage-
ment approaches such as auction
reserve prices, which might be
changed from one day to another
– do not affect the guarantees
given to investors under the guar-
antee scheme.
There would be significant free-
dom of scope in structuring such
guarantee contracts. Important
design elements are the amount
of guarantees issued, the level of
the target price, the exercise date
(or date range), the reference
price and the mode of allocating
contracts (eg by tender or by auc-
tion). Policymakers might also
decide to sell products differenti-
ated by exercise date and/or
target price. 
The implementation of a scheme
such as we have proposed could
be but does not necessarily have
to be done by the EIB. As a Euro-
pean public bank backed by
member-state taxpayers’ money,
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19. The reason for this is
that the portfolio of an
allowance and a
guarantee would yield
more than €28.57 if the
allowance price rises
above €40 (the present
value of a carbon price of
€50 is €35.70). If the
carbon price is with 14
percent probability €50
and otherwise €0, the
value of the portfolio
would be €29.57. Minus
the cost of the allowance
this is €24.57.
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the EIB would be a credible coun-
terpart for writing such guarantee
contracts. Legally, it is plausible
that only the governing council of
the EIB, consisting of the finance
ministers of the member states,
would have to agree to such an
operation by simple majority.
The auctioning of a limited
number of long-term carbon price
guarantees could be used to sta-
bilise the current, functioning
system around the already-
agreed linear reduction factor. It
would provide flexibility for poli-
cymakers to change future cli-
mate policy and at the same time
BOX 2: THE PROPOSAL IN PRACTICE
To give one example, the European Investment Bank (EIB) might be
asked to auction off guarantees for buying back one billion al-
lowances for the year 2030 at a target price of €40.
(1) Fair price of the guarantee:
The guarantee to be allowed to sell an emission allowance in 2030 at
€40 is worth slightly more than the discounted guaranteed price (at a
two  percent interest rate this is €28.57) minus the current cost of an
allowance (currently €5), ie €23.5719. Consequently, with no change
to the carbon price, the EIB would produce significant upfront rev-
enues from selling guarantees.
(2) Confidence in the system increases:
As a consequence of the political commitment to buy back one billion
allowances in 2030 at a price of €40, market participants will under-
stand that it is cheaper for future policymakers to stabilise the ETS,
than to allow it to fail and thus to have to pay the insured companies.
Hence, regulatory uncertainty will diminish and risk premia will de-
cline. This will encourage long-term investment in low-carbon tech-
nologies that crucially depend on the future carbon price and that are
currently too risky. Furthermore, the ability to bundle allowances and
guarantees into a safe asset would allow companies to more easily
refinance their low-carbon projects through financial markets (asset-
backed securities). Earlier long-term investments in low-carbon tech-
nologies should allow Europe to pursue a smoother and hence
cheaper decarbonisation pathway.
(3) The current EUA price will rise:
With the reduced risk premia, intertemporal arbitrage will force the
current carbon price to rise. One focal point for the current price is the
expected 2030 price of €40 discounted at a risk-free interest rate of
two percent. This would be €28.57.
With increasing current allowance prices, the incomes for national
treasuries will increase as they auction off their annual allocations of
allowances. At the same time, the income of the EIB from selling
guarantees will shrink. It might make sense to compensate for this
implicit transfer.
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would socialise the cost that such
shifts have for locked-in low
carbon investors. This will unlock
low-carbon investment. In addi-
tion, the guarantees would re-
store credibility in the ETS. This
will increase current carbon
prices and hence result in more
immediate abatement. 
Notwithstanding this operation,
the current ETS linear emission re-
European commitment to increase
the reduction factor appears politi-
cally difficult. It is thus crucial to
quickly stabilise the ETS in order to
allow it to continue to play its im-
portant role of cost-effectively
synchronising Europe’s existing
decarbonisation commitments.
Research assistance by Amma
Serwaah is gratefully
acknowledged.
duction factor is not sufficient to
meet the 2050 decarbonisation
target set out in the Commission’s
Roadmaps. Hence, a further tight-
ening of the system – requiring a
change to the directives – would
be necessary to achieve the 80-95
percent decarbonisation target by
2050. In the light of the current
economic situation and the uncer-
tain state of international climate
negotiations, an early and credible
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